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ABSTRACT
Is international law developing towards the recognition of a
peremptory obligation for States and international organizations to
stabilize anthropogenic greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions, so as to
collectively attain a sustainable global average temperature increase? Do
States have an obligation to cooperate and achieve this objective? Does
such an obligation extend to non-State subjects? This Article explores the
possibility that a new peremptory norm is progressively emerging in
international law to contain global average temperature increase within
sustainable limits, currently well below 2°C and possibly even 1.5°C
above pre-industrial levels under the Paris Agreement, as well as its
nature and scope. Arguably, the international and domestic practice of
sovereign entities, civil society and NGOs is supportive, including the
quasi-universal participation of States and international organizations
in the UNFCCC and related instruments. Furthermore, the fundamental
and shared nature of the atmosphere and climate, which cannot be
adequately protected via conventions, compels thinking in terms of a goaloriented erga omnes duty akin to an obligation of result, triggering
universal invocation of responsibility, sanctions, and enforcement. In
light of the evolution of international law, the obligation to achieve
sustainable anthropogenic GHG emissions could also address non-State
natural and legal persons as both duty-bearers and right-holders, waiving
immunity and triggering universal jurisdiction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Scientific evidence demonstrates that climate change is a
reality that threatens the environmental stability of the earth, with
serious implications for life. According to recent data, the world
is on track to experience an average increase in air temperature
of more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels.1 The latest studies
prove that, whilst periodic warming has taken place on earth
through the ages, significant warming has only happened on a
1. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, AR5, LONG-TERM CLIMATE CHANGE: PROJECTIONS,
COMMITMENTS AND IRREVERSIBILITY 1031 (2013); Xiaoxin Wang, Dabang Jiang &
Xianmei Lang, Climate Change of 4C Global Warming above Pre-industrial Levels, 35
ADVANCES ATMOSPHERIC SCI. 757, 758 (2018); Alan Buis, Study Confirms Climate Models
Are Getting Future Warming Projections Right, NASA (Jan. 9, 2020),
https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2943/study-confirms-climate-models-are-getting-futurewarming-projections-right [https://perma.cc/R8KH-HABP].
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global scale since the industrial revolution.2 In absolute terms,
major emitters of greenhouse gas (“GHG”) include the United
States, Canada, China, India, Russia, and Japan.3 Major per capita
emitters include Australia, the United States, Canada, and Saudi
Arabia.4
Global warming causes phenomena such as sea-level rise,
changing ocean currents, weather patterns, and desertification,
which affect the foundations of society, including the enjoyment
of basic claims such as the rights to self-determination, life,
health, and culture.5 The threat is impelling and not much time
remains to take action to avert it.6 According to a classical model
of multilateral environmental agreements (“MEAs”) based on a
framework convention and additional protocols, the
international community addresses the issue of anthropogenic
GHG emissions essentially via obligations established under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”)7 and related regulatory instruments. In light of
such a premise, this Article sets out to assess the nature of the
obligation to achieve sustainable anthropogenic GHG
concentrations in the atmosphere. More specifically, the analysis
focuses on the question whether this duty is emerging as a
peremptory international obligation. This is a critical step and

2. Raphael Neukom, Nathan Steiger, Juan José Gómez-Navarro, Jianghao Wang &
Joannes Werner, No Evidence for Globally Coherent Warm and Cold Periods over the
550
(2019),
Preindustrial
Common
Era,
571
NATURE
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1401-2; The Great Climate Conundrum, 12
NATURE GEOSCIENCE 581 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41561-019-04281.pdf [https://perma.cc/5694-8832].
3. Hannah Ritchie & Max Roser, CO2 and Other Greenhouse Gas Emissions –
Cumulative CO2 Emissions (Aug. 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-othergreenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/V88T-7YAZ].
4. Id.
5. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C
– SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 9 (2018); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND LAND – SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 7 (2019);
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, THE OCEAN CRYOSPHERE – SUMMARY
FOR POLICYMAKERS 10 (2019).
6. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C
– MITIGATION PATHWAYS COMPATIBLE WITH 1.5°C IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 112 (2018).
7. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 4, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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arguably the only way to develop a compelling universal
framework to address the problem of global warming.
Part II of this Article outlines the criteria that identify a
peremptory norm, particularly in light of recent work of the
International Law Commission (“ILC”).8 Against this
background, Part III considers the normative emergence of an
erga omnes obligation for States and international organizations to
curb anthropogenic GHG emissions via an essential analysis of
the domestic and international practice of sovereign and nonsovereign subjects. Part IV addresses the structure of the
obligation in light of its content, notably as an erga omnes goaloriented cooperative duty akin to an obligation of result. Part V
focuses on procedural implications, with respect to invocation of
responsibility, sanctions, and enforcement. Part VI explores the
possibility that, besides sovereign entities, the obligation at issue
also addresses non-State natural and legal persons as both dutybearers and right-holders. Each Part defines a theoretical
framework concerning the relevant aspects of an international
obligation and contextualizes such theoretical elements by
applying them to the obligation to achieve a sustainable
concentration of anthropogenic GHG emissions in the
atmosphere.
II. CRITERIA IDENTIFYING A PEREMPTORY NORM
There are no universal criteria to establish a peremptory
norm.9 Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“VCLT”)10 provides:
Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General
International Law (‘Jus Cogens’)
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with
a peremptory norm of general international law. For the
purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of
general international law is a norm accepted and recognized
8. ILC, Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens), Text of the
Draft Conclusions and Draft Annex Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committee on
First Reading, 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.936 (May 29, 2019) [hereinafter Peremptory
Norms]
9. ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 43
(2006).
10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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by the international community of States as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international
law having the same character.11

Under VCLT Article 64 (Emergence of a New Peremptory
Norm of General International Law (“Jus Cogens”), “[i]f a new
peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void
and terminates.” The same rules are embedded in Articles 53 and
64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between
States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations (“VCLTIO”).12 On this basis, the ILC assumes that
there are two criteria for identifying a peremptory norm: its
general nature (1) and its universal acceptance as a nonderogable rule (2).13 Indeed, acceptance of non-derogability is
considered the distinguishing feature of jus cogens with respect to
other general obligations.14
More specifically, peremptory norms are indivisible general
obligations, that is, duties owed by legal persons to the
international community as a whole, which are also classified as
“erga omnes” obligations.15 These are indivisible general duties:
since they are non-severable, such obligations are necessarily nonderogable by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements, as
general consensus is required for derogation. In other words, an
erga omnes obligation jointly binds a subject vis-à-vis all the other
subjects of the international legal system as a unitary duty,
embedding a set of interdependent claim-obligation relations,
whereby there is a “fusion” of inter-personal duties.16
Consequently, a sovereign entity cannot regulate such a duty
without the consent of all the sovereign entities enjoying
11. See also Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 1.
12. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations, Mar. 21, 1986, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.129/15.
13. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 1-2, Conclusion 4.
14. Id. at 2, Conclusion 6.
15. Id. at 4, Conclusion 17; see also Prosecutor v. Furundžija, IT-95-17/1-T,
Judgment, ¶ 151 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 10, 1998); ILC, Rep.
to the General Assembly on the Work of the Seventy-First Session, 190-192, U.N. Doc.
A/74/10 (2019) [hereinafter ILC Report].
16. Willem Riphagen, State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate
Relations, in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 581, 609-10 (Ronald
St. John MacDonald & Donald Johnston eds., 1983).
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correlative rights. In other words, if an obligation is erga omnes, it
is necessarily cogens.17
In light of the univocal correspondence between duties and
rights, the erga omnes obligations of A vis-à-vis B and C, B vis-à-vis
A and C, as well as C vis-à-vis A and B entail correlative erga omnes
rights.18 In fact, the erga omnes obligation of A and B vis-à-vis C
matches the erga omnes right of C vis-à-vis A and B, who also enjoy
the same position. Indeed, Hohfeld underscored that “a duty is
the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most
properly called a right or claim.”19 More specifically, Keslen
pointed out that the ‘“right’ or ‘claim’ of an individual is merely
the obligation of the other individual or individuals,” since “if
one designates as ‘right’ the relation of one individual toward
whom another individual is obligated to a certain behaviour, then
this right is merely a reflection of the obligation.”20 Erga omnes
obligations are different from severable universal duties and
rights, such as the freedom of the high seas, which is bilaterally
and multilaterally negotiable, hence only theoretically generally
applicable.
Peremptory norms are identified particularly based on the
content of an obligation, that is, the interest protected, which
requires a case-by-case assessment.21 The interest protected is
indeed the element that makes an obligation universal and
indivisible, hence non-derogable.22 Against this analytical
background, the ILC has outlined principal and subsidiary
sources to identify peremptory norms. Among principal sources,
there are domestic and international acts of States, such as public
statements, diplomatic correspondence, legislation, decisions of
national courts and treaty provisions, as well as resolutions
17. THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL
CONTRACT 11, 352 (2015); DANIEL COSTELLOE, LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF PEREMPTORY
NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (2017). The opposite, however, is not necessarily true,
because States might agree on the peremptory nature of an obligation for reasons other
than its non-severable structure.
18. See HUGH THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 165 (2d ed. 2019).
19. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-33 (1913); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental
Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 717 (1916).
20. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 127 (Max Knight trans., 1989).
21. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 43.
22. Christian Dominicé, The International Responsibility of States for Breach of
Multilateral Obligations, 10(2) EUR. J. INT’L L. 353, 356-57 (1999).
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adopted by an international organization or intergovernmental
conference.23 Subsidiary sources include the case law of
international courts, particularly the ICJ, work of specialized
bodies, such as the ILC itself, and scholarly opinions.24 In light of
this framework, it is legitimate to investigate whether there is a
possible evolution of the obligation to curb anthropogenic GHG
emissions into a peremptory norm of general international law,
considering the key steps in this trajectory.
III. THE EMERGENCE OF AN ERGA OMNES OBLIGATION TO
ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
A. International Treaties: The UNFCCC and Related Instruments
According to the typical structure of MEAs, the main
regulatory instruments on GHG emissions are the UNFCCC and
related regulation. The Preamble to the UNFCCC provides that
“change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects” is of
concern “to humankind.” This implies that the breach of the
obligation to curb GHG emissions is of interest to the
“international community as a whole,” hence erga omnes.25 In this
respect, it has been noted that the collective impact of climate
change is much more serious than that of breaches of currently
acknowledged peremptory norms.26 Recent developments
confirm such views: the World Health Organization (“WHO”)
considers that climate change puts ecosystems and wildlife under
stress, increasing the likelihood of pandemics, and diminishes the
capacity of society to respond, for instance, by aggravating water
scarcity.27 In light of this premise, UNFCCC Article 2 provides:

23. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2-3, Conclusion 8; ILC Report, supra note
15, at 168-70.
24. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 3, Conclusion 9; ILC Report, supra note 15,
at 170-74.
25. Shinya Murase (Special Rapportuer), Second Report on the Protection of the
Atmosphere, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/681, at 31-32 (Mar. 2, 2015). Similar considerations have
been developed as concerns crimes against humanity (M. Cherif Bassiouni, International
Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 (1996)).
26. Mark Byrne, Climate Crime: Can Responsibility for Climate Change Damage Be
Criminalised?, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 278, 280 (2010).
27. Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19): Climate Change, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 22,
2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/q-a-on-climate-change-and-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/G6K5-VEND].
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The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related
legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may
adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions
of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system.28

This obligation is further spelled out in detail in UNFCCC
Article 3, according to the precautionary principle: “[t]he Parties
should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or
minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse
effects.” Moreover, according to UNFCCC Article 4(1)(c), these
obligations entail a cooperative effort, so that all Parties have to
“[p]romote and cooperate in the development, application and
diffusion, including transfer, of technologies, practices and
processes that control, reduce or prevent anthropogenic
emissions of greenhouse gases.”
Thus far, 197 Parties have ratified the UNFCCC. These
include all Member States of the United Nations, as well as
Palestine, Niue, the Cook Islands, and the European Union
(“EU”).29 Together with the Montreal Convention on the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, the UNFCCC is the closest treaty
to universal participation, given that the Vatican is the only nonparty State.30
Based on emission levels in 1990, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol
outlined reduction targets for industrialized countries by 2012,31
aiming to reduce GHG emissions by at least five percent below
1990 levels (Article 3). Some industrial States extended Kyoto
commitments up to 2020,32 whereas others agreed on voluntary

28. UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 2.
29. Id.
30. Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General Close to Universal Participation, UNITED
NATIONS
(May
27,
2016),
https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/events/2016/Treaties/list_global_english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9SYC-2A3S].
31. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
32. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. C.N.718.201 (Dec. 8, 2012).
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measures under the Copenhagen Accord.33 Article 3(1) of the
Kyoto Protocol established that developed countries, as indicated
in Annex I to the UNFCCC, should “individually or jointly, ensure
that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not
exceed their assigned amounts.”34 To date, 192 Parties have
ratified the Protocol, although critical States are not parties,
notably Canada and the United States.35 Furthermore, the
number of 144 States necessary for the entry into force of the
Doha Amendment was reached on October 1, 2020, signaling
“the willingness of the international community to deliver on key
climate pledges.”36
The Kyoto Protocol has been progressively replaced by the
2016 Paris Agreement,37 which recognizes that climate change is
“a common concern of humankind” (Preamble). The Agreement
commits the Parties to “[h]olding the increase in the global
average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial
levels” and “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to
1.5°C” (Article 2).38 Accordingly, Article 3 provides that, based on
“nationally determined contributions, all Parties are to undertake
and communicate ambitious efforts . . . with the view to achieving
the purpose of this Agreement as set out in Article 2.”39 In
comparison with the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement
involves a significant shift towards a collective effort to reduce
anthropogenic GHG emissions. Thus far, 195 sovereign entities

33. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the
Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/Add.1
(Mar. 30, 2009).
34. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, art. 3(1).
35. Id.; see generally Jon Hovi, Detlef Sprinz & Guri Bang, Why the United States Did
Not Become a Party to the Kyoto Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US Perspectives, 18 EUR. J.
INT’L RELATIONS 129 (2010); CAMILLA V. RAMOS FJELLVANG, WHY DID CANADA
WITHDRAW FROM THE KYOTO PROTOCOL? (2014).
36. Press Release, UNFCCC, Ratification of Multilateral Climate Agreement Gives
Boost to Delivering Agreed Climate Pledges and to Tackling Climate Change (Oct. 2,
2020),
https://unfccc.int/news/ratification-of-multilateral-climate-agreement-givesboost-to-delivering-agreed-climate-pledges-and [https://perma.cc/H2ER-KSET].
37. Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
38. Id.
39. Id. (emphasis added).

932 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

have signed the Agreement and 191 have ratified it.40 The United
States announced its withdrawal under the Trump presidency on
June 1, 2017,41 with effectiveness from November 4, 2020, but
newly elected President Biden announced that the United States
will rejoin the Paris Agreement early during his mandate.42
The quasi-universal participation of States in key conventions
is a critical indicator of the emergence of a universal obligation.43
However, the presence of a persistent objector would exclude the
subjection of a State or other sovereign entity to a customary
rule,44 rebutting the presumption of general acceptance and
excluding universal application.45 If the conduct of States that
have resigned from UNFCCC instruments, such as the United
States under the Trump administration, were to be interpreted as
a form of persistent objection, the existence of a quasi-universal
obligation would still provide a basis for the possible affirmation
of a peremptory norm.46 In fact, absolute universal acceptance is
not necessary for the existence of jus cogens, which would be
tantamount to establishing a power of veto;47 rather, the consent
of a majority of States is required, including powerful ones.48 In
this context, it can also be assumed that those States and other
sovereign entities that do not take direct part in a given customary
practice, but do not explicitly object to it, tacitly consent to such

40. Paris Agreement - Status of Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification
[https://perma.cc/8XV2-RWYQ] (last visited Mar. 13, 2021).
41. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, U.S. EMBASSY &
CONSULATES IT. (June 1, 2017), https://it.usembassy.gov/statement-president-trumpparis-climate-accord [https://perma.cc/LH95-XVM4].
42. Quirin Schiermeier, The US Left the Paris Climate Deal: What’s Next?, NATURE
(Nov.
4,
2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-03066-x
[https://perma.cc/5FQJ-DD27].
43. ILC, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifteenth Session, U.N. Doc. A15509, at 188, 189
(1963); CHRISTOS ROZAKIS, THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES 66
(1976); ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 111.
44. Patrick Dumberry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of the Persistent Objector
Revisited, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 779 (2010); THIRLWAY, supra note 18, at 102.
45. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131,138-39 (Dec. 2018).
46. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2, Conclusion 5.
47. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. V. S. Afri.), Judgment, 1966, I.C.J.
6, 250, 291 (July 18) (dissenting Opinion by J. Tanaka).
48. Dire Tladi, Second Report to the ILC on Jus Cogens, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/706 34-35,
¶¶ 67-69 (2017).
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a practice.49 The existence of a peremptory rule compelling
sustainable GHG emissions would override possible objections
and ensure the universal application of the obligation.50
B. Other International Initiatives
The UNFCCC system has been established within the context
of significant international developments in environmental
matters. As early as 1976, in his Fifth Report to the ILC, Professor
Ago, First Rapporteur on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
(“DASR”), proposed a distinction between State “crimes” and
“delicts.” Under Article 18, a crime was conceived of as a “serious
breach by a State of an international obligation established by a norm
of general international law accepted and recognized as essential by the
international community as a whole.”51 State crimes included acts
against “the conservation and the free enjoyment for everyone of
a resource common to all mankind.”52 In 1980, the ILC approved
the First Part of the DASR and included the notion of a State
“crime” in Article 19, embedding the concept of “an
internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a
State of an international obligation so essential for the protection of
fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is
recognized as a crime by that community as a whole.”53 Among
other offenses, State crimes included “a serious breach of an
international obligation of essential importance for the
safeguarding and preservation of the human environment, such
as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the
seas.”54 This provision was later confirmed in the first complete
version of the DASR approved by the ILC in 1996.55
49. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1984, I.C.J. 246, 305, ¶ 130 (Oct. 12) (holding that acquiescence is
“equivalent to tacit recognition manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party
may interpret as consent,” based on the principles of good faith and equity).
50. See infra Section IV.A.
51. Roberto Ago, Fifth Report on State responsibility: The Internationally Wrongful Act of
the State, Source of International Responsibility, [1976] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 54, ¶ 155,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/291/Add.1&2 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-second Session,
[1980] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 32, UN Doc. A/35/10 (emphasis added).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session,
[1996] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 60, U.N. Doc. A/51/10.
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On this basis, the Third Rapporteur to the ILC on State
Responsibility, Professor Arangio-Ruiz, proposed a procedural
mechanism allowing any State to unilaterally resort to the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). Article 17(1) included in
his proposal for the Second Part of the DASR allowed any State
to bring an alleged State crime to the attention of the UN Security
Council or of the General Assembly. The Council or Assembly
could then adopt a resolution at qualified majority, authorizing
the complaining State to submit the case to the ICJ in order to
obtain a consultative opinion or a judgment in a contentious
procedure open to the intervention of all States. The ICJ would
have been vested with the power to impose sanctions and to allow
general countermeasures under Articles 16-18.56
In light of the uncertainty of the notion of a State “crime,”
the fourth Rapporteur on the DASR, Professor Crawford,
proposed to replace this concept with the notion of a “serious
breach of an erga omnes obligation,”57 triggering general
invocation of responsibility and countermeasures.58 The final
version of the DASR approved by the ILC in 2001 eventually
replaced the concept of a State “crime,” including environmental
offenses, with that of a “serious breach by a State of an obligation
arising under a peremptory norm of general international law,”59
entailing
universal
invocation of
responsibility
and
countermeasures.60 Prospectively, the DASR might become a
binding treaty.61 The same approach is replicated in Article 41 of

56. Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Fifth Report on State Responsibility, [1993] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L
L. COMM’N 42, ¶ 164, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/453/Add.3; Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, Seventh
Report on State Responsibility, [1995] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 24, ¶¶ 108–112, U.N. Doc.
A/CN. 4/469.
57. James Crawford, First Report on State Responsibility, [1998] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L.
COMM’N 23, ¶¶ 92–93, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/490/Add.1–7; James Crawford, Third Report
on State Responsibility, [2000] 2(1) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 32, ¶ 96, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/507/Add.1–4; see also James Crawford, International Crimes of States, in THE LAW
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 405, 413 (James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon
Olleson & Kate Parlett eds., 2010).
58. Crawford, Third Report, supra note 57, at 108, art. 51; JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 390-94 (2013).
59. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session,
[2001] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 112, U.N. Doc. A/56/10.
60. Id. at 113, 117, 126, 137.
61. G.A. Res. 71/33, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Dec.
13, 2016).
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the 2011 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations (“DARIO”).62
These developments have taken place against the
background of the concept of “sustainable development,” which
in 1987 the Brundtland Report qualified as “development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs,” including
environmental protection and eradication of poverty.63
Therefore, the Report affirmed that “[a]ll human beings have the
fundamental right to an environment adequate for their health
and well being,”64 thus referring to an erga omnes right, hence
duty, to a sustainable environment. This approach is consistent
with Article 2(3) of the 1986 UN Declaration on the Right to
Development (“UNDRD”), which provides that “States have the
right and the duty to formulate appropriate national
development policies that aim at the constant improvement of
the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals.”65
Significantly, the UNFCCC Preamble and Articles 2, 3 and
4(1)(d) establish a link between sustainable development and
climate change. In 2017, the ILC recognized that, given that the
atmosphere has “limited assimilation capacity,” States must
ensure a “sustainable utilization,” including “the need to
reconcile economic development with protection of the
atmosphere.”66
Along these lines, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment clearly recognized a “fundamental” right to
a sustainable environment, which was couched in terms of a
solemn commitment towards present and future generations for
the protection of a globally common good.67 Considering hard
law, at the regional level Article 24 of the 1981 African
62. Report to the General Assembly on the Work of the Sixty-Third Session, [2011] 2(2) Y.B.
INT’L L. COMM’N 82, U.N. Doc. A/66/10, 2(2).
63. World Comm’n on Env’t and Dev., Our Common Future, Report ¶ 27 (1987).
64. Id. Annex 1: Summary of Proposed Legal Principles for Environmental
Protection and Sustainable Development Adopted by the WCED Experts Group on
Environmental Law, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
65. G.A. Res. 41/128, Declaration on the Right to Development Art. 2(3) (Dec. 4,
1986) (emphasis added).
66. ILC, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 159 (2018),
Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere, Guideline 5.
67. Report of the UN Conference on Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 4 (1972), Declaration on the Human Environment, Principle 1.
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Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”) provides
that “all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory
environment favorable to their development.” Whilst such a right
has not yet been established under general international law, the
1994 UN Draft Principles on Human Rights and the Environment
recognized that “[a]ll persons, individually and in association with
others, have the duty to protect and preserve the environment.”68
In its work on jus cogens, the ILC has indicated a list of
peremptory obligations.69 The list does not include a duty to curb
GHG emissions, but it is not exhaustive. In this regard, according
to the First Rapporteur to the ILC on jus cogens, Professor Tladi,
“it might seem obvious that norms that aim at protecting the
environment (at least some of them) would have the status of jus
cogens,” but paradoxically “there is no strong evidence of nonderogability,” notwithstanding “the empirical fact of the
importance of environmental rules for the very survival of
humanity and the planet.”70 Whereas this statement may be true
as concerns the obligation to protect the environment, this does
not necessarily adequately reflect the reality of the more specific
obligation to curb GHG emissions. Indeed, the Rapporteur
concedes that “[i]t may well be that some rules, like some relating
to the environment, have the status of jus cogens which has yet to
be accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole, with the result that the effects in law of jus cogens
do not yet flow from such [rules].”71 Furthermore, the list drafted
by the ILC includes two obligations that can be linked to an erga
omnes obligation to curb GHG emissions, that is, the prohibition
of crimes against humanity and the right to self-determination.
Indeed, in 2018 the former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
and the Environment, Professor Knox, recommended that the
UN General Assembly recognize the “human right to a healthy
environment” in “a global instrument.”72 In this regard, the ILC
68. ECOSOC, Review of Further Developments in Fields with Which the SubCommission Has Been Concerned: Human Rights and the Environment, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, Annex I, Principle 21 (1994) (emphasis added).
69. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 5, Conclusion 23.
70. Dire Tladi, Fourth Report to the ILC on Peremptory Norms of General International
Law (Jus Cogens), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/727, at 61-62, ¶ 136 (2019).
71. Id.
72. John Knox, Report on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment
of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, U.N. Doc. A/73/188 13, 17 ¶¶ 37,
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has pointed out that the rules of international law relating to the
protection of the atmosphere must be interpreted harmoniously
with other relevant norms of international law, including those
on trade, investment and human rights.73 Moreover, climate
change particularly affects the right to self-determination of
people, as acknowledged by the IPCC in the Fifth Assessment
Report on Climate Change.74 In fact, the ILC’s 2018 Guidelines
on the Protection of the Atmosphere highlight the “special
situation of low-lying coastal areas and small island developing
States due to sea-level rise.”75 More generally, the ILC has
acknowledged that “the protection of the atmosphere from
atmospheric pollution and atmospheric degradation is a pressing
concern of the international community as a whole,” including
“the interests of future generations of humankind.”76 This
formulation was adopted in light of “the gravity of the
atmospheric problems”77 and is a critical step in the recognition
of the erga omnes nature of the obligation to curb GHG
emissions.78 Indeed, in their comments on the obligation to
protect the atmosphere under the ILC’s Guidelines, some States
have underscored its erga omnes nature.79
Turning to international case law, in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros,
the ICJ adjudicated upon the agreed construction of a barrier in
the Danube River by Hungary and Slovakia, which Hungary

46 (2018); see also David Boyd, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights
Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/74/161 25, ¶ 96, (July 15, 2019). “A safe climate is a vital element of the
right to a healthy environment and is absolutely essential to human life and well-being.”
73. ILC, supra note 66, at 187, Guideline 9.
74. Climate Change: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, AR5, Chapter 29, Small
Islands, IPCC (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/ [https://perma.cc/D3PZCGFV].
75. ILC, supra note 66, at 158, Preamble.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 165, Commentary.
78. Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the General
Assembly During Its Seventy-Third Session on the Work of the ILC of Its Seventieth
Session (2018), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/724 20, ¶¶ 104, 107 (2019) (underscoring the erga
omnes nature of the obligation to protect the atmosphere in light of its relevance to the
international community as a whole).
79. ILC, Protection of the Atmosphere: Comments and Observations Received
from Governments and International Organizations, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/735, at 21-22
(Feb. 11, 2020) (confirming the stance of the Special Rapporteur Shinya Murase, Sixth
Report on the Protection of the Atmosphere, UN Doc. A/CN.4/736 18 (Feb. 11, 2020)).
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unilaterally abandoned.80 In the course of the dispute, Hungary
argued that the “obligation not to cause substantive damage to
the territory of another State” has evolved “into an erga omnes
obligation of prevention of damage pursuant to the
‘precautionary principle,’” overriding a conventional obligation
to construct a barrier in the Danube River.81 Slovakia objected
that “none of the intervening developments in environmental
law” has given “rise to norms of jus cogens.”82 The ICJ held that
“[n]either of the Parties contended that new peremptory norms
of environmental law had emerged,” and the Court was
consequently not required to examine the scope of VCLT Article
64.83 However, in light of its previous advisory opinion on the
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,84 the Court
considered whether Hungary could invoke necessity on
environmental grounds and underscored “the great significance
that it attaches to respect for the environment, not only for States
but also for the whole of mankind.”85 In his separate opinion in the
case, Judge Weeramantry considered that a bilateral and
multilateral approach to sustainable development and
environmental protection “scarcely does justice to rights and
obligations of an erga omnes character – least of all in cases
involving environmental damage of a far-reaching and
irreversible nature.”86 Therefore, “[i]nternational environmental
law will need to proceed beyond weighing the rights and
obligations of parties within a closed compartment of individual
State self-interest, unrelated to the global concerns of humanity
as a whole.”87 More specifically, in Certain Activities Carried Out by
Nicaragua in the Border Area, Judge Dugard underscored that
“[t]he obligation not to engage in wrongful deforestation that
results in the release of carbon into the atmosphere and the loss

80. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept.
25, 1997).
81. Id. at 62, ¶ 97.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 67. On VCLT Art. 64, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
84. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 95, at 226, 241, ¶¶ 27-29 (1996).
85. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 80, at 41, ¶ 53.
86. Id. at 117 (separate opinion by Weeramantry, J.).
87. Id. at 118 (separate opinion by Weeramantry, J.).
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of gas sequestration services is certainly an obligation erga
omnes.”88
Scholars are divided on the possibly peremptory nature of
international environmental norms.89 Birnie, Boyle, and
Redgwell assume that there are no peremptory norms in
international environmental law.90 Taking a diametrically
opposite stance, Orakhelashvili considers that norms prohibiting
large-scale pollution, including the no-harm rule, have a
peremptory nature, particularly because massive pollution affects
the international community as a whole.91 Similarly, Ragazzi
highlights the erga omnes nature of environmental obligations.92
The ILC has underscored that there is “support” for
acknowledging the erga omnes nature of the obligations pertaining
to global atmospheric degradation, but the legal consequences of
such a recognition are not yet fully clear.93 Whereas such a
comprehensive approach cannot be easily reconciled with the
restrictive perimeter of jus cogens rules, it is sensible to argue that
there is a sufficiently consistent practice to consolidate the opinio
juris that, as a sub-species of the right to environmental
sustainability, the obligation to cooperate and curb GHG
emissions is evolving as an erga omnes duty.94
C. Domestic Practice
Currently, more than 178 States acknowledge the right to a
sustainable environment via constitutions, statutes and court
decisions.95 More than 100 States recognize the right to a
88. See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica
v. Nicar.), Compensation Owed by the Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa
Rica, 2018 I.C.J. 15, 120 (Feb. 2, 2018) (dissenting Opinion by Dugard J., ad hoc).
89. See WEATHERALL, supra note 17, at 259-60; ILC, supra note 66, at 175, Guideline
3.
90. See PATRICIA BIRNIE, ALAN BOYLE & CATHERINE REDGWELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 109-10 (2009).
91. See generally ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 65.
92. See generally MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 157 (1997).
93. See generally ILC, supra note 66, at 175.
94. See ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 114 (explaining the customary nature of
peremptory rules).
95. See John H. Knox, Preliminary Report on Human Rights and the Environment, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/22/43 5, ¶ 12 (Dec. 24, 2012); DAVID BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
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sustainable environment at the constitutional level;96 for instance,
this is the case of the Preamble to the French Constitution and
Article 26 of the Chinese Constitution. It is therefore possible to
conceive of the right to a sustainable environment as a general
principle of law, that is, a principle inferred from the major legal
systems of the world, according to ICJ Statute Article 38(2)(c). In
fact, in his Preliminary Report on Human Rights and the
Environment, Knox affirmed that “were the Universal
Declaration [of Human Rights] to be drafted today, it is easy to
imagine that it would include a right [to environment]
recognized in so many national constitutions and regional
agreements.”97
This framework has provided domestic courts with a basis to
develop consistent case law on the more specific right to a
climatically sustainable environment. Notably, in Urgenda, a
District Court in The Hague held the Netherlands responsible for
excessive GHG emissions, based on a general duty of care.98
According to the Court, since “the current global emissions and
reduction targets of the signatories to the UN Climate Change
Convention are insufficient to realise the 2° target,” the
Netherlands “is obliged [under a duty of care] to take measures
in its own territory to prevent dangerous climate change.”99 On
October 9th, 2018, the Appeals Court of the Hague confirmed
the decision of the District Court, upholding the duty of the
Netherlands to reduce GHG emissions by at least twenty-five
percent by 2020 compared to 1990 levels.100 However, the
judgment of the Appeals Court shifts the focus from the duty of
care to the rights to life and to private and family life under
Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights

ENVIRONMENT 45 (2012); see generally Marek Prityi et al., Locating Environmental Law
Functions among Legislative, Judicial and Implementation Bodies, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ACROSS CULTURES: COMPARISONS FOR LEGAL PRACTICE 43, 48-72 (Kirk W. Junker ed.,
2020).
96. Knox, supra note 95, at 5, ¶ 12. See also Louis Kotzé & Wendy Muzangaza,
Constitutional International Environmental Law for the Anthropocene?, 27 RECIEL 278, 28182 (2018) (discussing “global environmental constitutionalism”).
97. See Knox, supra note 95, at 6.
98. See Urgenda Foundation v. The Neth., Case n. HAZA C/09/00456689, 1 (2015).
99. See id. ¶ 4.65.
100. See Neth. v. Urgenda Foundation, Case n. 200.178.245/01, The Hague Court
of Appeal, ¶ 73 (2018).
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(“ECHR”).101 On December 20th, 2019, the Dutch Supreme
Court confirmed this approach.102 Although the nature of the
right to life is subject to debate, different sources support its
peremptory structure.103 This has prompted a meaningful
improvement in the climate policy of the Netherlands, triggering
negotiations for a National Climate Act aiming to reduce GHG
emissions by forty-nine percent compared to 1990 by 2030, and
by ninety-five percent by 2050, including a completely carbon
dioxide (“CO2”) neutral production of electricity.104
In Barragán v Colombia, the Supreme Court of Columbia
reversed the decision of a court of first instance and upheld the
claim of twenty-five plaintiffs against the State and private
corporations for depleting the Amazon rainforest and increasing
CO2 emissions.105 The Court held the defendants in breach of the
fundamental right to a safe environment, in violation of both the
Colombian Constitution and the Paris Agreement.106 This
decision is consistent with the jurisprudence of the High Court of
Lahore, which held that the State of Pakistan must reduce its
GHG emissions based, inter alia, on the constitutional rights to
life and to a sustainable environment.107 More specifically, the
Court held that “[f]rom environmental justice, which was largely
localized and limited to our own ecosystems and biodiversity it is
necessary to move to Climate Change Justice,” whereby
“[f]undamental rights lay at the foundation of these two
overlapping justice systems.”108 In Juliana v. United States, the US
101. Id. at ¶¶ 40-43.
102. See Neth. v. Urgenda Foundation, Case n. 19/00135, Supreme Court of The
Netherlands, ¶¶ 5.9.1, 8.3.5 (2019).
103. See Teraya Koji, Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond:
From the Perspective of Non-Derogable Rights, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 917, 927 (2001); Tladi, supra
note 70, at 57, ¶ 128.
104. See Climate Policy, Report, https://www.government.nl/topics/climatechange/climate-policy [https://perma.cc/HNZ4-4WKS] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021);
Letter to the House of Representatives about the Proposal for a National Climate
Agreement from the Minister of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy (June 28, 2019);
Dutch
National
Climate
Agreement,
June
28,
2019,
https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2019/06/28/climate-agreement
[https://perma.cc/KD2W-63NL] (last visited Mar. 17, 2021).
105. See Barragán et al. v. Colom. Presidency et al., STC-4360-2018, Case n. 1100122-03-000-2018-00319-01, Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia 25-26 (2018).
106. Id. at 45-46, ¶ 14.
107. See Case WP n. 25501/2015, High Court of Lahore ¶ 12 (2015).
108. Id. at 7.

942 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:4

District Court for the District of Oregon rejected a motion to
dismiss a claim asserting the insufficiency of the US government’s
policies to reduce GHG emissions, considering that “the right to
a climate system capable of sustaining human life is fundamental
to a free and ordered society.”109 Therefore, the Court
determined that it can “make findings that define the contours
of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to life and a habitable atmosphere and
climate” and “declare the levels of atmospheric CO2s which will
violate their rights,” thus being able to “direct the federal
defendants to prepare and implement a national plan which
would stabilize the climate system and remedy the violation of
plaintiff’s rights.”110 The case is pending on appeal.111
These developments can be interpreted as a sign of the
emergence of a general principle of law, that is, a universal
obligation, which compels the constraint of anthropogenic GHG
emissions within sustainable limits, as a specific component of the
broader obligation to achieve environmental sustainability.
According to the views of Georges Scelle, internal practice can
also be interpreted as a sign of reciprocal external recognition by
States concerning the emergence of a customary international
rule.112 In this respect, Knox concluded that the “[r]ecognition
of the right to a healthy environment by the United Nations
would complement, reinforce and amplify the regional and
national norms and jurisprudence developed over the past 45
years.”113 Furthermore, the 2007 Malé Declaration on the Human
Dimension of Climate Change invokes the “fundamental right to
an environment capable of supporting human society and the full
enjoyment of human rights,” which is recognized in “the
constitutions of over one hundred States and directly or indirectly
in several international instruments.”114 According to the ILC, the

109.
110.
111.
112.

See Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1250 (D. Or. 2016).
Id.
Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 2020).
See generally GEORGES SCELLE, PRECIS DE DROIT DES GENS: PRINCIPES ET
SYSTEMATIQUE (1932).
113. Knox, supra note 72, at 13-14, ¶ 39.
114. See Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Climate Change, ASS’N SMALL
ISLAND STATES (2007), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L39K-WBRP].
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general principles of law afford a common basis for the
establishment of jus cogens.115
D. Practice of non-State Natural and Legal Persons
Customary norms develop not only via State practice, but
also emerge in a purposive way through societal processes that
can be largely informal and unconscious, involving claims and
reactions to claims.116 Thus, grassroots movements and, more
generally, the activity of non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) invoking a sustainable climate policy worldwide can be
interpreted as a further sign of the emergence of a peremptory
norm.117
Various NGOs have contributed in a significant way to
signaling and publicizing the importance and impact of climate
change on present and future generations, backing the formation
of the consciousness of humankind, which is the ultimate
foundation of peremptory norms. NGOs have thus contributed to
lobbying support for sustainable climate policies and have
created decisive linkages between the scientific community and
the public, as well as between global and local societies.118 Among
innumerable initiatives, Friends of the Earth successfully led a
campaign to prompt the UK government to pass the Climate
Change Act 2008.119 The World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”) has
tirelessly campaigned to prompt action against climate change,
measure carbon footprints, and change life patterns.120 As
115. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2, Conclusion 5; ILC Report, supra note
15, at 161-62.
116. Daniel Bodanskiy, Prologue to a Theory of Non-Treaty Norms, in LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MICHAEL REISMAN 119, 130 (Mahnoush Arsanjani, Jacob
Cogan, Robert Sloane & Siegfried Wiessner eds., 2011).
117. Jean D’Aspremont, Non-State Actors and the Social Practice of International Law, in
NON-STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (Math Noortmann, August Reinisch &
Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2015); ILC Report, supra note 15, at 167.
118. Chiara Giorgetti, The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in the Climate Change
Negotiations, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENV’T L. & POL’Y 115, 137 (1998); Christopher Rootes et al.,
Climate Change, National Politics and Grassroots Action: An Introduction, 21 ENV’T POL. 677,
686 (2012); BENOÎT MAYER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CLIMATE CHANGE 249 (2018).
119. Neil Carter, What Has the UK Climate Law Achieved and Where Next?, FRIENDS
EARTH (Aug. 8, 2018), https://friendsoftheearth.uk/climate-change/what-has-the-ukclimate-law-achieved [https://perma.cc/LT4Z-UY2U].
120. World Wildlife Fund, Who We Are, https://www.wwf.org.uk/who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/58CB-AME5] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
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concerns grassroots movements, campaigners began protesting
outside the Swedish Parliament in 2018 and have now become the
image of future generations threatened by climate change.121
Businesses have also played an important role in supporting
sustainable climate action. For instance, the World Business
Council for Sustainable Development brings together around 200
chief executive officers to support the implementation of the
Sustainable Development Goals.122 Often, NGOs collaborate with
the public sector to foster sustainable climate initiatives. For
example, the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
Partnership (“REEEP”) is a cooperative platform for
governmental and non-governmental actors that has promoted
multi-stakeholder cooperation on renewable energy, climate
change, and sustainable development.123 Normatively, UNFCCC
Article 4(1)(i) acknowledges the critical role of NGOs in
stimulating and increasing public awareness on climate change,
as signatories must “[p]romote and cooperate in education,
training and public awareness related to climate change,”
encouraging “the widest participation in this process, including
that of non-governmental organizations.”124
Although they are not, strictly speaking, formally part of the
acceptance and recognition of a norm as jus cogens,125 NGOs have
played an important role in the development of climate change
regulation. Indeed, UNFCCC Article 7(2)(l) recognizes that the
Conference of the Parties (“COP”) can rely, where appropriate,
on the services and cooperation of competent international
organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental
bodies, as well as information provided by them. Furthermore,
UNFCCC Article 7(6) allows the participation of “[a]ny body, or
agency, whether national or international, governmental or nongovernmental” in the COP. NGOs have thus had frequent
121. See Ali Smith, They See Us as a Threat because We’re Having an Impact, GUARDIAN
(July 21, 2019, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/jul/21/greatthunberg-you-ask-the-questions-see-us-as-a-threat [https://perma.cc/EL69-C9VG].
122. News & Insights, WBCSD, https://www.wbcsd.org [https://perma.cc/9J9P3U3X] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
123. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency P’ship, About REEEP,
https://www.reeep.org/about-reeep [https://perma.cc/5J4K-PNQW] (last visited Feb.
4, 2021).
124. UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 4(1)(i).
125. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2, Conclusion 7, ¶ 3.
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contacts with governmental representatives and have been kept
informed on the progress of climate negotiations. Non-profit
organizations that have played a significant part in climate change
negotiations include the WWF, Climate Action Network,
Greenpeace, the Environmental Defense Fund and the World
Watch Institute.126 Among profit organizations, fossil-fuelintensive energy industries, the chemical industry, renewable
energy businesses, and insurance companies have participated in
UNFCCC negotiations via organs such as the Climate Council, the
Global Climate Coalition and the International Climate Change
Partnership.127 This means that the norms of the UNFCCC and
related instruments that recognize the erga omnes importance of
climate change for humankind also crystallize the societal
consensus that NGOs have contributed to creating.
IV. STRUCTURE OF THE OBLIGATION
A. Content and Configuration
The atmosphere is a gaseous envelop surrounding the
earth128 and climate is average weather over a long period.129
GHGs absorb infrared radiation and trap it in the atmosphere,
causing global warming. The main sources of GHGs are CO2,
nitrous
dioxide
(“N2O”),
methane
(“CH4”),
and
chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCS”),130 which are particularly emitted
via fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas), agricultural activities, decaying
organic matter, aerosol sprays, and air conditioning.131
The atmosphere and climate are “global commons,” more
specifically, “shared resources,” which are different from
126. Giorgetti, supra note 118, at 127.
127. Id. at 131-32.
128. Laurent Cosineau, Atmosphere – Definition, CLIMATE CHANGE GUIDE,
https://www.climate-change-guide.com/atmosphere-definition.html
[https://perma.cc/WV6M-6TZP] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); ILC, supra note 66, at 168,
Guideline 1; Shinya Murase (Special Rapporteur), First Report to the ILC on the Protection
of the Atmosphere 42, 47 ¶¶ 65, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/667 (2014).
METEOROLOGICAL
ORG.
(2019),
129. What
Is
Climate?,
WORLD
http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/wcp/ccl/faq/faq_doc_en.html
[https://perma.cc/4BNC-CWNC].
130. Susan Solomon et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 19, 23-24 (2007); Murase, supra note 128, at 51, ¶ 76.
131. LUDIVINE TAMIOTTI ET AL., TRADE AND CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2009).
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atmospheric airspace as a domain subject to appropriation:132
damage is of “common concern.”133 Hence, if a State emits
unsustainable GHGs, all other States of the international
community
are
affected;
furthermore,
international
organizations and non-State subjects are affected too. Climate
change is also a specific case where all States of the international
community are “directly injured” by the breach. In fact, although
the negative effects of climate change vary in intensity in different
States, it is impossible to distinguish between “directly” and
“indirectly” injured States under DASR 48.134 Given the shared
interest protected, a bilateral derogation from the obligation to
achieve sustainable emissions between States A and B would also
affect States C, D and E. The same principle applies under DARIO
49.135 On this basis, it is possible to develop relevant inferences on
the nature of the obligation breached.
The debate over the legal protection of the atmosphere and
climate as global commons leads to the conclusion that there is at
least overlap between obligations protecting global commons,
erga omnes duties and jus cogens.136 The framework is nonetheless
not fully clear, so that some scholars conclude that it is preferable
to address the question from the angle of the particular
effectiveness of treaties, in light of VCLT and VCLTIO Article 60,
which entails the possibility of a unilateral or multilateral
suspension of a convention by the injured States.137 This approach
is based on the concept of an “integral” or “interdependent”
obligation, whereby the breach by a State or an international
organization allows all other States and international
organizations to withdraw from the obligation.138 However, this
view obviously entails the possibility of a dissolution of the
UNFCCC and related instruments: as in 2017 the United States
resigned from the Paris Agreement, all States could withdraw
from the Agreement, with disastrous consequences for the
132. Murase, supra note 128, 52, 54, ¶¶ 79, 84.
133. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Liability for Environmental Damage Caused to the Global
Commons, 5 REV. EUR., COMPAR. & INT’L ENV’T L. 305 (1996); Global Commons, A
DICTIONARY OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2d ed., 2018).
134. Report, supra note 59, at 126.
135. Report, supra note 62, at 89.
136. Fitzmaurice, supra note 133, at 306-07.
137. Id. at 310.
138. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 93.
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international community as a whole. The answer to this impasse
is the affirmation of the universally non-derogable nature of the
obligation to curb GHG emissions under customary law. In other
words, the shared nature of the protected interest and its
importance make it necessary to move from an integral and
derogable erga omnes partes obligation139 to a universally nonseverable erga omnes duty.140 In light of the catastrophic
consequences of the breach, a hypothetical bilateral or
multilateral agreement allowing States and international
organizations to exceed sustainable anthropogenic GHG
emissions should be null and void. In fact, no treaty has thus far
been concluded that derogates from the UNFCCC and related
instruments; furthermore, the resignation of Canada from the
Kyoto Protocol in 2011141 and that of the United States from the
Paris Agreement in 2017 have not triggered significant
withdrawal by other States. This signals that a collective
consciousness is developing on the importance of the interest at
stake as a universal and non-derogable one.
A critical element for establishing the peremptory nature of
a norm is the fact that it protects a fundamental interest from
which no one must deviate, essentially belonging to the
international “public order.”142 Peremptory rules “reflect and
protect fundamental values of the international community, are
hierarchically superior to other rules of international law, and are
universally applicable.”143 In light of available scientific data,144 it
can be safely assumed that ensuring a sustainable climate is the
most fundamental environmental challenge for the international
community.145 It is a classic case where the essential interests of
the international community as a whole prevail over bilateral and
multilateral interests.146 This is confirmed by the normative
139. Crawford, Third Report, supra note 57, at 34-35, ¶¶ 106-07.
140. Christina Voigt, State Responsibility and Climate Change Damage under
International Law, 77 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 5, 14 (2008).
141. Canada
Withdraws
from
Kyoto
Protocol,
IISD
(2011),
http://sdg.iisd.org/news/canada-withdraws-from-kyoto-protocol
[https://perma.cc/T37C-NJAL].
142. Prosecutor v. Furundžjia, Case n. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 153 (Dec. 10,
1998); ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 36.
143. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 1, Conclusion 3.
144. IPCC, supra notes 1, 5.
145. See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 26, at 279-80.
146. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 67.
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evolution of regulation in the matter, whereby environmental
protection is progressively being established as a fundamental
right under international law, which raises the further possibility
of conceiving of a right to a sustainable climate (correlative of the
duty to curb carbon emissions) as a human right per se.147
The peremptory nature of the obligation to achieve
sustainable GHG emissions would allow individual States and
international organizations to be considered bound without and
despite their agreement.148 Indeed, according to the ILC,
acceptance and recognition by “a very large majority of States” is
necessary for the identification of a norm as a peremptory rule,
but not absolute consensus by all States and international
organizations.149 In this regard, the recognition of the importance
of the obligation to curb GHG emissions for “humankind”
embedded in the Preamble to the UNFCCC can be read as a sign
of such acceptance.150 Critically, the persistent objector rule does
not apply to jus cogens.151 Hence, even if the practice of a noncooperative international organization or a State, notably the
United States under the Trump administration, were to be
regarded as a form of persistent objection, this would not exclude
the universally binding nature of the obligation to achieve
sustainable GHG emissions, particularly in light of the quasiuniversal participation in the UNFCCC and related
instruments.152 In any case, in light of its participation in the
negotiation of the UNFCCC and related instruments, including
the Copenhagen and Paris Agreements, the United States should
not be considered a persistent objector to the formation of a
universal rule compelling sustainable GHGs: no consistent

147. See discussion supra Sections III.B and III.C. On the possibility of conceiving of
the right to a sustainable climate as a human right per se, see Francesco Francioni &
Ottavio Quirico, Untying the Gordian Knot: Towards the Human Right to a Climatically
Sustainable Environment?, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 133 (Ottavio Quirico & Mouloud Boumghar eds.,
2016).
148. ORAKHELASHVILI, supra note 9, at 107.
149. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 2, Conclusion 7; ILC Report, supra note
15, at 168.
150. See discussion supra Section III.A.
151. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 4, Conclusion 14.
152. See discussion supra Section III.A.
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contrary practice emerges,153 but rather variations in practice
based on the prevailing political majority.
B. A Goal-Oriented Cooperative Duty Akin to an Obligation of Result
Having established that thinking about the obligation to
achieve sustainable GHG emissions as a peremptory duty is a
realistic perspective, it is necessary to consider how it is possible
to frame the obligation more analytically, in light of the
complexity of the interest protected. The 2001 DASR only
establishes under Article 12 that State conduct not in conformity
with an international obligation entails a breach of that duty,
regardless of its origin or character, without any further
distinction between obligations of conduct and obligations of
result. The same principle applies under DARIO 11. Conversely,
the 1996 DASR took a more analytical approach to the question
and outlined a clear distinction between international obligations
of conduct and result. Article 20 identified as “obligations of
conduct” those that must be implemented through means
specifically determined by the international obligation itself,
whereby the obligation is breached by the failure to adopt a
particular course of conduct.154 Article 21 outlined as “obligations
of result” those that require a State to achieve a particular aim,
leaving it to the State to achieve the objective by means of its own
choice, whereby a State is in breach if it does not comply with the
required outcome.155 The difference therefore depends on
whether an international obligation requires the positive or
negative performance of specific conduct, rather than the
establishment or maintenance of a particular situation. Assessing
whether an obligation is of conduct or of result necessitates a caseby-case consideration of specific regulatory instruments.156
Christina Voigt has qualified the duty to stabilize GHG
emissions as an obligation of conduct. According to a complex
argument, Voigt considers that “Article 4.2 UNFCCC in
conjunction with Article 2 . . . obliges parties to take action to

153.
154.
155.
156.

Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), Judgement, 1951 I.C.J. 116, 138-39 (Dec. 1951).
Report, supra note 55, at 60.
Id.
See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S DRAFT
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 124 (2002).
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adopt policies and measures to secure the stabilization of
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases.”157 More
precisely, the Parties to the UNFCCC would have an obligation
“not to ‘defeat’ the objective,” committing “to the stabilization
target” and being “bound by an ‘obligation of conduct’ to prevent
dangerous climate change under Article 2 UNFCCC.”158 Scholars
are divided on the nature of the more specific duty to “pursue
domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the
objectives of [nationally determined] contributions” under
Article 4(2) of the Paris Agreement, as an obligation of conduct
rather than result.159 With respect to the broader obligation to
protect the atmosphere, the ILC considers that “the States’
obligation ‘to ensure’ [that domestic activities do not cause
significant harm] does not require the achievement of a certain
result (obligation of result) but only requires the best available
efforts so as not to cause significant adverse effects (obligation of
conduct).”160
Clearly, affirming that the obligation to curb GHG emissions
is one of conduct would lead to significantly weakening the
implications of its peremptory nature, because States and
international organizations would not be compelled to achieve
specific reduction targets, but only to pursue the best efforts to
achieve them, regardless of the outcome. However, Wolfrum has
meaningfully pointed out that international law encompasses
goal-oriented obligations that compel States to implement an
evolutionary process leading to no concrete result or to a
concrete result in some (distant) future.161 Goal-oriented
obligations without a concrete result would be similar to
obligations of conduct, for instance, the duty to promote higher
standards of full employment under UN Charter Articles 55(5).
Goal-oriented obligations requiring the achievement of a
157. Voigt, supra note 140, at 6.
158. Id. at 6-7.
159. Benoît Mayer, Obligations of Conduct in the International Law on Climate Change:
A Defence, 27 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 130, 130-31 (2018); Jaap Spier, There Is
No Future Without Addressing Climate Change, 37(2) J. ENVTL. & NAT. RES. L. 181, 195
(2019).
160. ILC, supra note 66, at 176.
161. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Obligations of Result Versus Obligations of Conduct: Some
Thoughts about the Implementation of International Obligations, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE,
363, 366-67 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).
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concrete result, however distant, would be akin to obligations of
result. These would include duties such as the obligation to
pursue “a comprehensive policy for the preservation and
protection of the Alps by applying the principles of prevention,
payment by the polluter and cooperation,” via the sustainable use
of resources, such as energy, under Article 2 of the Convention
on the Protection of the Alps.162
Within the analytical framework outlined by Wolfrum, the
duty to curb GHG emissions should be framed as a goal-oriented
obligation. Indeed, UNFCCC Article 4(1) mentions the “long-term
temperature goal set out in Article 2.”163 UNFCCC Article 4(1)(c)
requires the Parties to “[p]romote and cooperate” to “reduce or
prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases,” whereby
the use of the word “promote,” in mandatory terms, identifies a
goal-oriented duty.164 Furthermore, the obligation to stabilize
GHG emissions should be considered akin to an obligation of
result, since it entails a commitment on the part of States to
ensuring a sustainable global average temperature increase
according to a defined standard, on a cooperative basis. Whilst
they are classified as obligations of conduct, when they include a
goal, cooperative duties are classified as obligations of result.165
Based on Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement, the minimum
standard is an average increase well below 2°C above preindustrial levels, with an effort not to exceed 1.5°C.166 The
achievement of this objective definitely fulfils the decisive
distinguishing criterion between goal-oriented obligations akin to
duties of conduct rather than result, which is the focus of an
international obligation to achieve “a specific and concrete
change of facts.”167 Once the result is achieved, there is an
obligation not to revise the facts, that is, not to change the
conditions that maintain GHGs within sustainable limits.168
The language of relevant normative instruments, particularly
the UNFCCC and related Agreements, is significant for classifying
162. Adopted November 7, 1991; in force March 6, 1995. See Wolfrum, supra note
161, at 367.
163. UNFCCC, supra note 7 (emphasis added).
164. Wolfrum, supra note 161, at 368.
165. Id. at 373.
166. Paris Agreement, supra note 37, art. 2(1)(a).
167. Wolfrum, supra note 161, at 367.
168. Id.
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the obligation to achieve a sustainable global temperature
increase as a goal-oriented duty akin to an obligation of result.
Notably, UNFCCC Article 2 mentions “[t]he ultimate objective of
this Convention and any related legal instruments . . . to achieve
. . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”169 The
Preamble to the Kyoto Protocol highlights that its norms were
adopted “[i]n pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention
[UNFCCC] as stated in its Article 2” to achieve sustainable GHG
emissions.170 Article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement underscores that
“in enhancing the implementation of the Convention
[UNFCCC], including its objective,” the Agreement “aims to
strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in
the context of sustainable development.”171 Within this
framework, Article 2(a) specifies that the Paris Agreement
“pursue[s] efforts” to limit temperature increase to 1.5°C above
pre-industrial levels, but “holds” temperature increase well below
2°C.172
The goal-oriented approach to the duty to achieve a
sustainable increase in global average temperature as an
obligation akin to a duty of result also allows the understanding
of the terms of the debate on the bindingness of the UNFCCC
and related instruments. Most scholars support the binding
nature of the UNFCCC and related instruments,173 in line with
the stance of the ILC, correctly in the view of the Author.174
However, some scholars have argued that the UNFCCC and
related instruments would only have a declaratory function,175
whilst others have suggested that these instruments are soft law.176
169. UNFCCC, supra note 7, art. 2 (emphasis added).
170. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31 (emphasis added).
171. Paris Agreement, supra note 37, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
172. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
173. See RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 135
(2005); Voigt, supra note 140, at 5-7 (arguing that the obligation to prevent climate
change also entails procedural duties in terms of environmental impact assessment); see
also DANIEL BODANSKY, JUTTA BRUNNÉE & LAVANYA RAJAMANI, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE LAW 119, 161, 212 (2017).
174. See ILC, supra note 66, at 160, Guideline 11.
175. See Reinhard Quick, ‘Border Tax Adjustment’ in the Context of Emission Trading:
Climate Protection or ‘Naked’ Protectionism?, 3 GLOBAL TRADE & CUST. J. 163, 169 (2008).
176. See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 90, at 359.
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Such different stances can be explained by the fact that goaloriented obligations seem to be somewhat “softer” than other
types of duties, but States are compelled to comply, since a lack
of performance would trigger responsibility.177 Thus, if the result
of containing global average temperature increase well below 2°C
under the Paris Agreement is not achieved, States and
international organizations should be considered liable: for the
purpose of determining responsibility, only the result matters.178
Otherwise, the 2°C objective would only be indicative, with
catastrophic implications for the environment, according to
scientific evidence. In this context, the objective is not specifically
established for each State individually, but collectively for all
States to achieve in a coordinated manner; therefore, States have
a certain degree of constraint in the process leading to containing
anthropogenic GHG emissions within sustainable limits.179 In its
Draft Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere, the ILC
has indeed underscored that States have an obligation to
cooperate with each other and with relevant international
organizations for the protection of the atmosphere from
atmospheric pollution and degradation.180 According to the
Special Rapporteur on the Protection of the atmosphere,
Professor Murase, “the concept of international cooperation is
now built to a large extent upon the notion of the ‘common
interests’ of the ‘international community as a whole’, rather than
on the ‘arithmetic aggregate’ of bilateral collaborative relations
in the traditional ‘international society.’”181
The quantum of the objective to be achieved varies, as the
evolution from the Kyoto Protocol to the Paris Agreement
demonstrates. The limits must be fixed according to scientific
evidence, based on the precautionary principle.182 Currently, it is
debatable whether a maximum increase in global average
temperature well below 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels is
sufficient. In fact, Article 2(1)(a) of the Paris Agreement entails a
commitment to possibly reducing temperature increase to a
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Wolfrum, supra note 161, at 368.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 373.
See ILC, supra note 66, at 160, Guideline 8.
Murase, supra note 25, at 37, ¶ 60.
ILC, supra note 66, at 173, Guideline 2.
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maximum of 1.5°C, which, according to a recent Report of the
IPCC, is a critical threshold for preventing extreme effects on
resources, ecosystems, biodiversity, food security, cities, tourism
and carbon removal.183 According to scientific reports, only such
an improved target will be sufficient to preserve the environment
of the Arctic and the Antarctic, which would otherwise not be able
to adapt, with serious implications in terms of ice melting, sealevel rise, change in ocean patterns, and loss of biodiversity.184
However, there is no mention of the Polar Regions in the
UNFCCC and related instruments: arguably, they have not been
adequately taken into account in the negotiating process of
climate change regulation.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF A BREACH: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT,
SANCTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT
There is no justification for a State in breach of a peremptory
norm.185 Considering that the obligation to curb GHG emissions
is goal-oriented and cooperative, the question arises as to when
responsibility actually arises. A possibility would be to assume that
responsibility arises when the set threshold for temperature
increase is not achieved. However, this would have catastrophic
implications for the entire international community and could
trigger a “race to the bottom,” with little possibility to achieve the
set aim itself. In this respect, in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros the ICJ noted
“the often irreversible character of damage to the
environment,”186 stressing that “a ‘peril’ appearing in the long
term might be held to be ‘imminent’ as soon as it is established,
at the relevant point in time, that the realization of that peril,
however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and
inevitable.”187 Furthermore, peremptory obligations entail for
States a specific duty to prevent a violation.188 The ILC has
183. IPCC, GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C – IMPACT OF 1.5°C GLOBAL WARMING ON
NATURAL AND HUMAN SYSTEMS (2018).
184. See generally IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND
VULNERABILITY, AR5 ch. 28, Polar Regions, 1570, 1572 (2014); GLOBAL WARMING OF
1.5°C, supra note 5, at 7; THE OCEAN CRYOSPHERE, supra note 5, at 6.
185. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 5, Conclusion 18.
186. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 80, at 78, ¶ 140.
187. Id. at 42, ¶ 54; see also Joni Hersch & Kip Viscusi, Allocating Responsibility for the
Future of Global Warming Policies, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 1657, 1688 (2007).
188. WEATHERALL, supra note 17, at 356.
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underscored that “States have the obligation to protect the
atmosphere by exercising due diligence in taking appropriate
measures, in accordance with applicable rules of international
law, to prevent, reduce or control atmospheric pollution and
atmospheric degradation.”189
It should therefore be assumed that responsibility arises
when a State or international organization does not comply with
individually scheduled reduction targets.190 Thus, the peremptory
obligation to achieve a maximum increase well below 2 or 1.5°C
in global average temperature would encompass a subset of
peremptory obligations to achieve specific GHG reduction
targets. However, a State or international organization that is not
a Party to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement will not be bound
by such targets; thus, the problem arises of determining how the
objectives can be established. The answer is that all injured States
and international organizations should determine binding
reduction targets proportionally to per capita emissions, along
the lines of the decisions of the District Court, Appellate Court,
and Supreme Court in the case of Urgenda.191 The Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC could determine such measures on
behalf of the international community as a whole.
When a State breaches a rule of jus cogens, specific
procedural consequences apply under the ILC’s 2001 DASR and
2011 DARIO.192 In fact, if an obligation is owed to the
international community as a whole and the breach of the
obligation is of such a character as to radically change the
position of all the other States and international organizations to
which the obligation is owed with respect to the further
performance of the duty, the latter can invoke responsibility.193
Besides a State or international organization directly affected by
the breach under DASR and DARIO 42(b)(i), all other indirectly
affected States and international organizations can invoke the
responsibility of the injurer under DASR and DARIO 42(b)(ii).194
189. ILC, supra note 66, at 159, Guideline 3.
190. See Spier, supra note 159, at 196 (arguing that nationally determined
contributions are minimum obligations).
191. See supra Section III.C; Spier, supra note 159, at 196.
192. DASR, supra note 59, art. 41; DARIO, supra note 62, art. 42.
193. DASR, supra note 59, art. 42(b)(ii); DARIO, supra note 62, art. 43(b)(ii).
194. Report, supra note 59, at 118-19, ¶¶ 11-12; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The
Deficiencies of the Law of State Responsibility Relating to Breaches of ‘Obligations Owed to the
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Thus far, the special Rapporteur on the protection of the
atmosphere has pointed out that “it may be too early at present
to interpret the concept of common concern as giving ‘all States
a legal interest, or standing, in the enforcement of rules
concerning protection of the global atmosphere,’ in view of the
absence of appropriate procedural law to implement such an
interpretation.”195 Because of the common interest protected, a
breach of the peremptory obligation to achieve sustainable
anthropogenic GHG emissions would affect all States and
international organizations, triggering universal invocation of
responsibility. In fact, the ILC’s Draft Conclusions on Peremptory
Norms provide that “[a]ny State is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of another State for a breach of a peremptory norm
of general international law (jus cogens)."196
Furthermore, under DASR 48 and DARIO 49 any State or
international organization other than the injured ones can
invoke responsibility, if the obligation breached is owed to the
international community as a whole, including cessation,
assurances of non-repetition, and reparation. According to the
ILC, a State or international organization entitled to invoke
responsibility under DASR 48 and DARIO 49 does not act based
on individual damage, but rather as a member of the
international community as a whole.197 In the case of the
obligation to curb GHG emissions, all States and international
organizations are affected and should thus be entitled to invoke
responsibility.
If a breach of jus cogens is “serious,” all States and
international organizations have an obligation to cooperate and
invoke responsibility, since DASR 41(b) and DARIO 42(1)
provide that States and international organizations “shall
cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means” such

International Community as a Whole’: Suggestions for Avoiding the Obsolescence of Aggravated
Responsibility, in REALIZING UTOPIA: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 210, 214-15
(Antonio Cassese ed., 2012).
195. Murase, supra note 128, at 57, ¶ 89.
196. Peremptory Norms, supra note 8, at 4, Conclusion 17, ¶ 2; ILC Report, supra
note 15, at 192.
197. Report, supra note 59, at 126, ¶ 1; see also Crawford, Third Report, supra note
57, at 67.

2021]

GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS

957

violations,198 whereby it is possible to interpret the expression
“lawful means” so as to also encompass invocation of
responsibility.199 A breach is “serious” when it entails a “gross or
systematic failure [to comply].”200 More specifically, “systematic”
means “carried out in an organized and deliberate way.”201
“Gross” refers to “the intensity of the violation or its effects” and
“denotes violations of a flagrant nature.”202 The “systematic” or
“gross” nature of the violation is based on “the scope and number
of individual violations” and “the gravity of their consequences
for the victims.”203 Furthermore, the “seriousness” of a breach
concerns “the intent to violate the norm.”204
According to DASR 59 and DARIO 67,205 the outlined
procedures complement the UN Charter, and can therefore be
followed by classical dispute resolution mechanisms,206 including
inquiry, negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and
judicial settlement, according to Chapter VI of the Charter.
Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that non-compliance with
sustainable GHG emissions triggers centralized procedures
centered on the Security Council under Chapter VII of the
Charter.207 Indeed, in light of the catastrophic consequences
predicted by scientific evidence, unsustainable GHG emission
trends could qualify as a “threat to” or “breach of” the peace
under UN Charter Article 39.208 Climate change can in fact
increase conflicts on a global scale in several ways, for instance, by
198. DASR, supra note 59, art. 41(b); DARIO, supra note 62, art. 41(1) (emphasis
added).
199. DASR, supra note 59, art. 41(b); DARIO, supra note 62, art. 42(1). See
COSTELLOE, supra note 17, at 187-90.
200. Report, supra note 59, at 113, ¶ 7; see also Crawford, Third Report, supra note
57, at 380-81; Paola Gaeta, The Character of the Breach, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 425-26 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010).
201. Report, supra note 59, at 113, ¶ 8.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Report, supra note 59, at 143; Report, supra note 62, at 104.
206. ILC, supra note 66, at 161, Guideline 12.
207. See generally SHIRLEY SCOTT & CHARLOTTE KU, The UN Security Council and
Global Action on Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 1,
11 (Shirley Scott & Charlotte Ku eds., 2018).
208. Christopher Penny, Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace and Security,
in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 25, 34 (Shirley Scott & Charlotte
Ku eds., 2018).
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causing loss of resources and territory and migrations.209 This
possibility actually strengthens the view that the obligation to curb
GHG emissions is a peremptory one, because only the most
serious violations of concern to the international community as a
whole trigger procedures under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.210 Conversely, in light of the dismissal of the projects
drafted by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz,211 general invocation of
responsibility does not entail the ability of injured and noninjured States and international organizations to bring a
unilateral action in international jurisdictions (actio popularis),
notably the ICJ.212 This would have afforded a useful remedy to
implement a goal-oriented obligation and achieve the result of
ensuring sustainable GHG emissions.
Sanctions include the classical duties of cessation, nonrepetition
and
reparation,
encompassing
restitution,
compensation and satisfaction under DASR and DARIO 30 and
31.213 Cessation would entail an obligation to bring the excessive
GHG emissions of a State or an international organization into
conformity with required limits, and non-repetition would
compel keeping GHG emissions within the required standard.
Reparation should take place via restitutio in integrum, by adding
excessive GHG emissions to a subsequent reporting period.
Despite a lack of clarity in relevant normative texts, these are
fundamentally the sanctions embedded in Articles 5-8 of the
Kyoto Protocol, with an emphasis on both enforcement and
facilitation of compliance,214 and under the “global stocktake”
procedure according to Articles 14 and 15 of the Paris

209. EU High Representative and European Commission, Climate Change and
International Security, Doc. S113/08 (2008); HARALD WELZER, CLIMATE WARS: WHAT
PEOPLE WILL BE KILLED FOR IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012); Penny, supra note 208, at 30.
210. Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, International Crimes and State Responsibility, INT’L
RESP. TODAY 63, 77 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005) (outlining offences that breach jus
cogens and trigger procedures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter); Nigel White,
Responses of Political Organs to Crimes by States, SYS. CRIM. INT’L L. 314, 328–29 (2009).
211. See supra Section III.B.
212. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 147 (Feb.
26, 2007).
213. Report, supra note 59, at 88; Report, supra note 62, at 77.
214. Shinya Murase (Special Rapporteur on the Protection of the Atmosphere),
Fifth Rep. on the Protection of the Atmosphere, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/711 21-23, ¶¶ 39-40
(Feb. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Fifth Rep.].
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Agreement, with an emphasis on facilitating compliance.215 Of
course, the peremptory nature of the obligation breached would
allow such remedies to be extended to non-cooperative States and
international organizations. Indeed, as concerns their scope,
sanctions should be erga omnes and peremptory, thus binding a
State or international organization vis-à-vis all other States and
organizations of the international community.216 In fact,
according to DASR and DARIO 33, sanctions may be owed “to
one or more States, to one or more other organizations, or to the
international community as a whole, depending in particular on the
character and content of the international obligation and on the
circumstances of the breach.”217 This approach is consistent with
the ILC’s Draft Guidelines on the Protection of the Atmosphere,
which, in case of “non-compliance”218 due to a lack of capacity,
require the adoption of facilitative procedures affording
assistance to States to ensure compliance with relevant
obligations.219
If a State or an international organization emitting
unsustainable GHG emissions does not comply with a sanction
imposed by means of unilateral invocation of responsibility and
ensuing procedures, that sanction can be enforced, notably via
countermeasures, as established in 2001 DASR 49 and DARIO
51.220 Consistent with 2001 DASR and DARIO 33, DASR 54 and
DARIO 57 establish the possibility of universal countermeasures
in the case of a breach of a peremptory norm.221 If the breach of
a peremptory obligation is “serious,” DASR 41(1) and DARIO
42(1) create an obligation for States and international
organizations to cooperate and end it.222 DASR 41(1) and DARIO
42(1) compel the taking of general countermeasures, and are
thus lex specialis with respect to DASR 54 and DARIO 57, which
only establish a right. Countermeasures must be limited in time,
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Id. at 23-24, ¶ 42.
Crawford, Third Report, supra note 57, at 106.
See Report, supra note 59, at 94; Report, supra note 62, at 78 (emphasis added).
Murase, supra note 128, at 15, 28, ¶¶ 26, 41.
ILC, supra note 66, at 160, Guideline 11(a).
Report, supra note 59, at 129; Report, supra note 62, at 92.
Report, supra note 59, at 137; Report, supra note 62, at 96.
Report, supra note 59, at 117; Report, supra note 62, at 83.
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reversible and proportionate, since their purpose is bringing the
breach of an international obligation to an end.223
A proportionate reaction to the breach of the peremptory
obligation to curb GHG emissions is the adoption of economic
countermeasures. Notably, border carbon adjustments (“BCAs”)
are considered a viable solution,224 particularly in light of the
jurisprudence of the WTO dispute settlement bodies on
environmental exceptions to free trade.225 In other words, if a
State or an international organization is not compliant with set
GHG reduction targets (primary rules), that State or
international organization is not paying for the environmental
externality it causes, so that its products and services have a
competitive advantage in the international market. All other
States and international organizations should therefore not only
be allowed to adopt proportionate BCAs under DASR 54 and
DARIO 57, but could also be compelled to act so (secondary
rules) under DASR 41(1) and DARIO 42(1), depending on the
gravity of the breach. In light of their universal scope, the
adoption of proportionate BCAs should be decided in a
coordinated way by the COP to the UNFCCC. If unsustainable
GHG emissions were to be considered a threat to or breach of the
peace under UN Charter Article 39, in light of the priority
established under 2001 DASR 59, DARIO 67, and UN Charter
Article 103, general countermeasures, particularly trade
sanctions, would complement collective enforcement via the UN
Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.226
VI. SCOPE OF THE OBLIGATION: EXTENDING THE DUTY TO
NON-STATE SUBJECTS?
As concerns attribution of responsibility, a State or an
international organization must adopt effective domestic
223. Report, supra note 59, at 129-35; Report, supra note 62, at 92.
224. Quick, supra note 175, at 163.
225. Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶ 164, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (Adopted Oct. 12, 1998);
Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and
Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 7.426, WTO Doc. WT/DS400/R, WT/DS401/R (Nov. 25,
2013); BODANSKY ET AL., supra note 173, at 334.
226. See Alan Boyle, Jacques Hartmann & Annalisa Savaresi, The UN Security Council’s
Legislative and Enforcement Powers and Climate Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
SECURITY COUNCIL 101, 115 (Shirley Scott & Charlotte Ku eds., 2018).
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legislation to constrain the conduct of natural and legal persons,
such as energy corporations, and achieve collectively agreed
international GHG reduction targets. A State’s GHG emissions
are indeed the result of aggregate emissions produced by all
natural and legal persons in a given country. The overall
emissions of an international organization, such as the EU, result
from the aggregation of emissions within the Member States.
Crucially, according to the judgment of the Appeals Court in
Urgenda, as confirmed by the Dutch Supreme Court, in light of
the commitment to limiting global warming well below 2°C under
Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, the ECHR establishes an
“obligation to protect the right to home and private life,” which
“applies to all activities, public and non-public.”227 It should be
considered that this is for a State and an international
organization a goal-oriented obligation of result; in fact, if a State
or an international organization is not able to prevent excessive
GHG emissions by all subjects within its territory, that State or
international organization must be considered in breach of a
compulsory objective. Of course, non-State subjects are also
responsible for not achieving established GHG reduction targets.
The question is therefore whether or not it is possible to conceive
of a peremptory obligation to achieve sustainable GHG emissions
also with respect to persons other than sovereign entities.
According to the evolution of international law, general
peremptory obligations address not only sovereign entities, but
also non-State persons, including natural and legal persons.
Notably, whilst the select circle of peremptory obligations is not
clearly defined, the obligations that are undoubtedly peremptory
address non-State persons as both right-holders and dutybearers.228 In Furundžjia, the International Criminal Tribuanl for
the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) clarified that the jus cogens
nature of a prohibition has a preemptive effect, signaling “to all
members of the international community and the individuals over whom
they wield authority” an “absolute value from which nobody must
227. Neth. v. Urgenda Foundation, Case n. 200.178.245/01, The Hague Court of
Appeal, ¶ 43 (2018); Neth. v. Urgenda Foundation, Case n. 19/00135, Supreme Court
of The Netherlands, ¶ 5.6.2 (2019). See also Jonathan Verschuuren, The State of the
Netherlands v. Urgenda Foundation: The Hague Court of Appeal Upholds Judgment Requiring
the Netherlands to Further Reduce Its Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 28 RECIEL 94, 95 (2019).
228. WEATHERALL, supra note 17, at 340-41.
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deviate.”229 Furthermore, according to UNDRD Article 2(3), the
right to development incorporates external State–State and
internal State–people and State–individual duty–right relations,
which complement an individual right to be enjoyed by every
person and a collective right belonging to all peoples and
States.230
From the standpoint of attribution of liability, the
peremptory nature of the obligation to curb GHG emissions
would entail the responsibility of all GHG emitters in breach of
sustainable thresholds in a given country. The peremptory nature
of the obligation would allow these persons to be held
responsible, regardless of whether they act secundum or contra
legem. In fact, in Furundžjia, the ICTY considered that conduct
permitted by national law, but in breach of peremptory norms,
remains internationally unlawful and is actionable in any State.231
This stance can be questioned in the context of States that take a
dualistic approach to international law. However, as peremptory
norms always override domestic legislation, it should be
considered that also in a dualistic context an individual can be
held responsible for contributing to failing to achieve established
GHG reduction targets.232
From the standpoint of the persons affected by the violation,
the breach of a peremptory obligation damages all State and nonState subjects of the international community. Accordingly, in
Furundžjia the ICTY held that the individual breach of an
international obligation has an “inherently universal
character.”233 The breach of a peremptory obligation to curb
GHG emissions would thus affect not only all other sovereign
entities of the international community, but also all other nonState entities and natural persons.
The consequences of the breach of a peremptory norm for
individuals have been mostly elaborated in the context of
international criminal law, where the violation of an erga omnes
obligation leads to universal and supranational prosecution
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Furundžija, supra note 15, at 59, ¶ 154.
See supra Section III.B.
Furundžija, supra note 15, at 59, ¶ 155.
Nulyarimma v. Thompson (1999) FCA 1192, ¶ 160 (Austl.).
Furundžija, supra note 15, at 60, ¶ 156.
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within the framework of international cooperation.234
Considering that the obligation to curb GHG emissions is
peremptory not only for States and international organizations,
but also for non-State natural and legal persons, would mainly
entail consequences in the sphere of torts. Depending on the
seriousness of the breach,235 a relevant implication would be the
exclusion of jurisdictional immunity for responsible natural
persons acting for a State in not ensuring compliance with agreed
reduction targets.236 Possibly, the exclusion of jurisdictional
immunity could also extend to a State or an international
organization in breach of the obligation to stabilize
anthropogenic GHG emissions, allowing adjudication by foreign
courts.237 Another implication could be the establishment of
universal civil jurisdiction. Whereas the principle of universal
jurisdiction has fundamentally been developed in the context of
criminal law, it is also progressively developing in the framework
of civil claims.238 Thus, proceedings could be initiated by potential
victims having locus standi “before a competent international or
national judicial body with a view to asking it to hold the national
measure to be internationally unlawful,” including “a civil suit for
damage in a foreign court, which would therefore be asked inter
alia to disregard the legal value of the national authorizing act.”239
VII. CONCLUSION
Peremptory norms (jus cogens) include erga omnes
obligations, that is, indivisible duties owed by a subject to the
international community as a whole, which are therefore nonderogable by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements.
Several consistent practices at the international and domestic
level allow the consideration that the obligation to achieve
sustainable anthropogenic GHG concentrations in the
234. Id.
235. See supra Part V.
236. WEATHERALL, supra note 17, at 310; Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 767 (4th Cir.
2012) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 897 (2014).
237. COSTELLOE, supra note 17, at 245. But see Jurisdictional Immunities of the State
(Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012, I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3).
238. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762-63 (2004); Donald Franics Donovan
& Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 A.J.I.L. 142
(2006); WEATHERALL, supra note 17, at 277.
239. Furundžija, supra note 15, at 60, ¶ 155.
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atmosphere specified in UNFCCC Article 2 is evolving as a
peremptory duty, as a sub-species of the universal obligation to
achieve environmental sustainability.
First, the UNFCCC and related instruments register quasiuniversal participation and there is no apparent persistent
objection. Acceptance and recognition by a very large majority of
States is necessary for the identification of a norm as a peremptory
rule, not absolute consensus. The recognition of the importance
of the obligation to curb GHG emissions for “humankind”
embedded in the Preamble to the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement
can be read as a sign of such acceptance. The Paris Agreement
also significantly extends mitigation targets to all the Parties.
Second, the evolution of the work of the ILC on the responsibility
of States and international organizations, soft and hard law
initiatives, particularly on human rights, as well as the
jurisprudence of the ICJ, show that massive environmental
pollution is evolving as a fundamental erga omnes norm. Third,
domestic constitutional and statutory legislation, as well as the
jurisprudence of domestic courts, allow the inference of a general
principle of law compelling sustainable GHG emissions. This
evidence is corroborated by the supportive practice of profit and
non-profit NGOs and grassroots movements.
Considering the structure of the obligation, the atmosphere
and climate are “global commons,” which clash with a relativist
approach to the duty to curb GHG emissions. Non-compliance
indeed affects all State and non-State subjects of the international
community. The unilateral or multilateral suspension of a
conventional obligation by the injured States and international
organizations under VCLT and VCLTIO Article 60 discloses the
possibility of a dissolution of the UNFCCC and related
instruments. In light of available scientific data, ensuring a
sustainable climate is emerging as the most fundamental
environmental interest of the international community,
overriding bilateral and multilateral interests. The shared and
fundamental nature of the protected interest compels shifting the
focus from an integral and derogable erga omnes partes obligation
to a universal erga omnes duty. Within such a framework, even if a
persistent objection were to arise, the peremptory nature of the
obligation would override it.
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In light of UNFCCC Article 2, it should be considered that
all States and international organizations have a goal-oriented
cooperative duty akin to an obligation of result. Article 2 of the
Paris Agreement spells out in detail this obligation by outlining a
maximum temperature increase well below 2°C above preindustrial levels. The threshold of sustainability is debatable and
should arguably be improved to a minimum of 1.5°C, given that
a lower standard entails irreversible consequences for areas
particularly affected by climate change, notably the Polar
Regions, with further severe implications for the global climate.
A State or an international organization should therefore be held
in breach of the obligation to curb GHG emissions when it does
not comply with set reduction targets aiming to achieve the
collective goal. This should trigger universal invocation of
responsibility, an obligation for a State or an international
organization to bring excessive GHG emissions into conformity
with required limits, and enforcement via universal
countermeasures, notably BTAs, under the DASR and DARIO.
Such procedures are subordinate to collective measures
undertaken by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter.
In light of the evolution of international law, the obligation
to achieve a sustainable concentration of anthropogenic GHG
emissions in the atmosphere could also address non-State natural
and legal persons as both duty-bearers and right-holders, waiving
immunity and triggering universal jurisdiction for particularly
serious violations. It is therefore impelling to seize the ICJ of the
question to deliver an authoritative opinion as to whether
international law includes a peremptory obligation to achieve
sustainable concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, and what
its scope of application is.
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